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Feticide Laws: Contemporary Legal
Applications and Constitutional Inquiries
Marka B. Fleming*
I. Introduction
An examination of crimes committed throughout the coun-
try within the last few years reveals a recognizable wave of
criminal offenses resulting in the deaths of unborn children or
fetuses.1  For instance, on February 15, 2008, Bobby Cutts, a
Canton, Ohio policeman, was convicted of the 2007 murder of
his girlfriend Jessie Marie Davis and aggravated murder of the
unborn girl that Davis had planned to name Chloe.2  Two
months later, on April 22, 2008, in Indiana, a masked gunman
entered an Indianapolis bank, jumped over the counter, and
shot teller Katherine Shuffield, who was five months pregnant
with twins.3  Shuffield survived, but her twin girls did not.4
Similarly, over the last two years in North Carolina, at
least a half-dozen pregnant women have been killed in acts of
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, North Carolina A&T State University;
J.D., North Carolina Central University School of Law, 1996; B.S., Wake Forest
University, 1993.
1. The author in no way attempts to express any opinion on the abortion issue
by using the terms “children” or “fetus” to connote the unborn.  Further, for sim-
plicity, the term “fetus” will be used to refer to all stages of prenatal development.
See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate Over Fetal Homicide Law, 67
OHIO ST. L.J.721, 721 (2006) (citing H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 83 (2004) (“A
human develops in a series of stages, each associated with a different medical
term: zygote (at fertilization), blastocyte (at implantation), embryo (at about two
weeks), and fetus (from 8 weeks until birth).”).
2. Chloe’s slaying, which jurors found occurred during the commission of an-
other crime, could have made Cutts eligible for the death penalty. See ‘Sorry’
Killer’s Life in the Jury’s Hands, CNN, Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/
CRIME/02/26/cutts.trial/index.html; see also Laura Johnson, Mom Reflects on Life
Without Jessie, PLAIN DEALER, June 14, 2008, at A1.
3. See Deanna Martin, Tragic Cases Often Spur Fetal Homicide Laws, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, June 30, 2008, available at http://
www.wsbt.com/news/regional/22698184.html.
4. Id.
43
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violence.5  Three of these deaths that have gained widespread
attention since June 2007 are: (1) the murder of Jennifer Niel-
sen, who was eight months pregnant when she was killed on
June 15, 2007; (2) the murder of Maria Lauterbach, a twenty-
year old soldier, who was eight months pregnant when she was
killed in December 2008; and (3) the murder of Megan Lynn
Touma, a twenty-three year old soldier, who was seven months
pregnant when she was found dead on June 21, 2008.6
The aforementioned cases are only a few of the many exam-
ples of violence perpetrated against pregnant women.7  One of
the most well-known instances of such violence occurred in
2002 when Scott Peterson murdered his wife Laci, who was
then eight months pregnant with Conner.8  In response to Laci’s
and Conner’s deaths, Congress enacted legislation making it a
separate crime to harm a fetus during an assault on the mother.
Most state legislatures have also passed laws against fetal
homicide, or feticide.  However, states have utilized different
5. See Marion Walker, Under Proposed Bill, Killing an Unborn Child Would
Carry Penalty, NEWS & OBSERVER, June 15, 2008, at A9.
6. See Mike Baker, Pregnant Soldier is Slain, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 1, 2008,
available at http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0708/532565.html; see also, Marion
A. Walker, Grieving Family Spurs Search for Killer, NEWS & OBSERVER, June 15,
2008, at A1.
7. See, e.g., Counts Added in Shooting Death, THE ADVOCATE, July 1, 2008, at
5 (man arrested for allegedly shooting his pregnant wife in the back of the head at
the couple’s home); Fetus’ Death is Homicide, Coroner Says: The Unborn Child’s
Mother, Rachel Roos was Eight Months Pregnant, NEWS-SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 2008
(twenty-three year old woman’s unborn child was shot to death, and shooting was
ruled a homicide); Louisville Man Charged with Fetal Homicide, ASSOCIATED
PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Nov. 24, 2004 (Louisville, Kentucky man charged
under Kentucky’s fetal homicide law with killing his unborn child after allegedly
hitting his pregnant wife six to eight times in the head and stomach); Lydia Mc-
Coy, Preston Taylor Pleads Guilty to Murder, Feticide, COURIER PRESS, June 3,
2008 (man pled guilty to the charges of murder and feticide for the death of a
pregnant woman); Allen Powell II, Man Faces Feticide Charge After Woman
Wounded; Three Other Shootings, Stabbing Probed in Jeff, TIMES PICAYUNE, May
6, 2008, at 1 (man accused of accidentally shooting a woman who was twenty-two
weeks pregnant, resulting in the fetus’s death); John Taylor, Fetal Homicide
Charge Still Possible in Shooting, JOURNAL WORLD, Feb. 2, 2008 (man charged
with first-degree murder for the January shooting death of pregnant woman).
8. On December 24, 2002, Laci Peterson disappeared from her home in Mo-
desto, California.  At the time of her murder, she was eight months pregnant.  A
few months later, the bodies of Laci and her unborn baby, who was to be named
Conner, were discovered on the shore of San Francisco Bay. See Brian Skoloff,
Monetary Motive Proposed in Peterson Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, June 18,
2004.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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methods for implementing these feticide laws.  Furthermore, in
some states, there have been recent appeals to modify existing
feticide laws.  In other states, although the feticide laws have
been in place for the last few years, these laws are just now
being applied or have not yet been applied.9
This article will examine: (1) the development of feticide
legislation; (2) the divergent approaches currently utilized
throughout the country in addressing feticide; (3) the specific
applications of feticide legislation that have led to calls for re-
form; and (4) some of the constitutional challenges surrounding
this legislation.  Finally, the article concludes with an analysis
of the quandary that is created by feticide legislation that pro-
tects the fetus from its mother.
II. The Common Law “Born Alive” Rule
Feticide is defined as “ ‘[t]he act . . . of killing a fetus, usu-
ally by assaulting and battering the mother . . . .’ ”10  Under En-
glish common law, a defendant could not be convicted of feticide
unless the government could prove that the victim was “born
alive” and then died as a result of prenatal injury.11  This “born
alive” rule was a result of the then unsophisticated state of
medical technology, which made it difficult to determine
whether the fetus was alive in the womb, what its cause of
9. For example, Maryland applied its feticide law to the first case ever in
March 2008. See Danny Jacobs, First Use of Maryland’s Fetal-Death Law Sets
Standard, DAILY RECORD, Apr. 14, 2008.
10. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Defining Life from the Perspective of Death: An
Introduction to the Forced Symmetry Approach, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 41, 58 n.79
(2006) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (7th ed. 1999)).
11. See Maj. Michael Davidson, Fetal Crime and Its Cognizability as a Crimi-
nal Offense Under Military Law, 1998 ARMY LAW. 23 (1998); see also State v.
Ashley, 670 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), quashed in part, 701 So.
2d 338 (Fla. 1997) (stating that the “born alive” doctrine “remains viable and has
been applied to a wide variety of circumstances throughout the United States”);
State v. Hammett, 384 S.E.2d 220, 221 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (“[I]t is not the victim’s
status at the time the injuries are inflicted that determines the nature of the crime
. . . but the victim’s status at the time of death which is the determinative factor.”);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 830 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Ky. 1992) (noting that state courts
which have applied the common law rule in similar situations have uniformly ap-
plied the “born alive” rule); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1329 (Mass.
1984) (holding that a viable fetus was within the ambit of the term “person” as
used in Massachusetts’ vehicular homicide statute).
3
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death was, and at what time it died.12  The “born alive” rule re-
solved the difficulty of establishing the required causal link be-
tween the death of the fetus and the third party’s conduct.13
Sir Edward Coke enunciated the rule that emerged in the
seventeenth century:
“If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion
or otherwise killeth it in her wombe, or if a man beat
her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body and she is
delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprison
[i.e., misdemeanor], and no murder, but if the child be
born alive and dyeth of the potion, battery, or other
cause, this is murder; for in law it is accounted a rea-
sonable creature, in rerum natura, when it is born
alive.”14
In other words, “only a child that was born alive and existed
independently of its mother received protection under [common
law] homicide laws.”15
Over time, the definition of “born alive” varied by jurisdic-
tion.16  For example, in early common law, for a baby to be a
victim of a homicide, he or she “ ‘must have been fully extruded,
have had an existence independent of its mother in that it pos-
sessed an independent circulation of its own and derived none
of its power of living through any connection with her.’”17  Addi-
tionally, many courts required that the child survive for some
period of time after the umbilical cord was severed in order to
be a homicide victim.18
12. See Alison Tsao, Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Vio-
lence or Sword to Pierce Abortion Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 460-61
(1998) (citing Tony Hartsoe, Person or Thing—In Search of the Legal Status of a
Fetus: A Survey of North Carolina Law, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 169, 211 (1995)).
13. See id. at 461.
14. Id. at 460 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (1817)).
15. Id. (citing Katherine Folger, When Does Life Begin . . . or End? The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Redefines Fetal Murder in People v. Davis, 29 U.S.F. L. REV.
237, 239 (1994)).
16. Davidson, supra note 11, at 24 (quoting United States v. Gibson, 17
C.M.R. 911, 923 (A.F.B.R. 1954) (“ ‘The term ‘born alive’ has been subject to vary-
ing interpretations in England and the state courts of this country . . . .’ ”)).
17. Id. (quoting Gibson, 17 C.M.R. at 923).
18. Id.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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By 1850, the “born alive” rule was widely adopted in the
United States’ legal system.19  Moreover, “[e]very American ju-
risdiction to consider the issue [of fetal homicide] on the basis of
common law, rather than a specific feticide statute, followed
some form of the born alive rule until 1984, when the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts extended its vehicular homi-
cide statute to a viable fetus.”20
In Commonwealth v. Cass,21 the defendant was convicted of
vehicular homicide after he struck an eight and a half month
pregnant pedestrian, thereby killing her viable fetus.22  The
court held that the legislature, in enacting the vehicular homi-
cide statute, contemplated that the term “person” would be con-
strued to include viable fetuses.23  This conclusion, the court
reasoned, was supported by legislative intent.  Since the vehicu-
lar homicide statute was enacted after Massachusetts courts
had determined that a fetus was a “person” for civil wrongful
death purposes, the legislature presumably “had knowledge of
this decision” and, therefore, must have intended a similar defi-
nition of “person” for the succeeding criminal statute.24  Legisla-
tive intent also supported the court’s holding that a “person”
was synonymous with a “human being,” and the offspring of a
human being is a human being, both inside and outside of the
womb.25  Finally, even if the legislature had never considered
the issue, the court assumed that the legislature intended for
19. Tsao, supra note 12, at 460-61.
20. Davidson, supra note 11, at 24 (citing Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d
1324, 1325, 1358 n.5 (Mass. 1984)).
21. 467 N.E.2d 1324.
22. Id. at 1325.  The defendant was charged with MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 90,
§ 24G(b) (2001), which provides, in pertinent part, that:
Whoever . . . operates a motor vehicle while . . . under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor, or of marijuana, narcotic drug, depressants, or stimulant sub-
stances, all as defined in section one of chapter ninety-four C, or the vapors
of glue, or whoever operates a motor vehicle recklessly or negligently so that
the lives or safety of the public might be endangered and by any such opera-
tion causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of homicide by a
motor vehicle . . . .
Id.
23. Id. at 1326.
24. Id. at 1325.
25. Id.
5
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courts to define the term “ ‘person’ by reference to established
and developing common law.”26
Presently, a minority of states still follow the common law
“born alive” rule.27  Application of this rule was demonstrated in
State v. Oliver,28 a case in which the defendant was charged
with careless and negligent operation of a motor vehicle result-
ing in the death of an in utero fetus at a gestational age of
thirty-four to thirty-five weeks.29  The Vermont Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s refusal to find probable cause for the
charge, on the grounds that a fetus was not a person within the
meaning of the statute governing negligent operation of a motor
26. Id. at 1326.
27. The twelve states that still follow the common law “born alive” rule are
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Wyoming. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-101(2) (2004) (“ ‘Person’, when referring to the victim of a homi-
cide, means a human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the
homicidal act.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 222 (2008) (“ ‘Person’ means a human
being who has been born and is alive . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.005 (2008)
(“ ‘Human being’ means a person who has been born and was alive at the time of
the criminal act.”); State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156, 158 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986)
(“[A]lmost every state court that has had a homicide statute, similar to Connecti-
cut’s, that did not define ‘human being’ explicitly to include a fetus have [sic] held
the words ‘person’ or ‘human being’ would not include the unborn child or fetus.”);
State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Haw. 2005) (stating that for the purposes of
Hawaii’s statute governing  criminal offenses against a person, the term “person”
is defined as a human being who has been born and is alive); State v. Elliott, 43
P.3d 279, 284 (Mont. 2002) (defining a human being as “a person who has been
born and is alive”); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 137 (N.H. 1980) (“No inde-
pendent cause of action for wrongful death lies on behalf of a nonviable fetus that
never achieves live birth.”); In re A.W.S., 440 A.2d 1174 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct.
1980), aff’d, 440 A.2d 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (finding that a fetus
was not within the protected class under New Jersey’s homicide law); State v. Wil-
lis, 652 P.2d 1222, 1224 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a viable fetus is not a
“human being” within the meaning of the vehicular homicide statute and noting
that under the common law, “until born alive there was no human being”); State v.
Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1989) (“We do not discern any legislative intent to
include the act of killing a viable fetus within the murder statute.”); State v. Oli-
ver, 563 A.2d 1002, 1003 (Vt. 1989) (stating that under the common law, one could
not be charged with the murder of a fetus unless the child was born alive and then
died); State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d 469, 476 (Wyo. 1954) (finding that in order to con-
vict an accused of infanticide, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the infant was born alive, and, if the infant was born alive, that death was caused
by the criminal agency of the accused).
28. 563 A.2d 1002.
29. Id. at 1002.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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vehicle.30  Further, the court held that the legislature did not
intend for a fetus to be protected under this statute.31  The court
explained that the “born alive” rule was in effect at the time the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle statute’s predecessor
statute was first enacted, and neither the negligent operation of
a motor vehicle statute nor its predecessor expressly changed
this common law rule.32
III. The Status of Federal and State Feticide Legislation
Notwithstanding the minority of states that follow the com-
mon law rule, the federal government and the majority of states
have abandoned this approach in lieu of feticide laws that pro-
tect the unborn—from the age of conception or from a later time
of development.33
A. Federal Legislation: The Unborn Victims of Violence Act
of 2004
The federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act,34 also known
as Laci’s and Conner’s Law, was prompted by the murder of
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1003-04.
32. Id.
33. See Jennifer A. Brobst, The Prospect of Enacting an Unborn Victims of
Violence Act in North Carolina, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 127, 140 (2006).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004).  The Act provides in pertinent part that:
(a)(1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions of
law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily injury
(as defined in section 1365 [18 U.S.C. § 1365]) to, a child, who is in utero at
the time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this
section.
(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the punishment
for that separate offense is the same as the punishment provided under Fed-
eral law for that conduct had that injury or death occurred to the unborn
child’s mother.
(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that—
(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have
had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or
(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the
unborn child.
(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally kills or
attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall instead of being pun-
ished under subparagraph (A), be punished as provided under sections
1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title [18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1112, and 1113] for
intentionally killing or attempting to kill a human being.
7
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Laci and Conner Peterson in 2002.35  President Bush signed the
act into law on April 1, 2004, thereby creating a separate crime
for harming a fetus during an assault on the mother.36
This act amended the United States Code and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice for purposes of “protecting unborn chil-
dren from assault and murder and for other purposes.”37  For
the most part, the law confers upon the federal government the
authority to prosecute, for a separate offense, those who, during
the commission of a federal crime, “cause[ ] the death of, or bod-
ily injury to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct
takes place . . . .”38  As defined in the act, “the term ‘unborn
child’ means a child in utero,” which, in turn, “means a member
of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is
carried in the womb.”39  Hence, the act provides protection for
the unborn during all stages of development.
Under the act, the punishment for the offense of injuring or
killing an unborn child “is the same as the punishment provided
under Federal law for that conduct had the injury or death oc-
curred to the unborn child’s mother.”40  However, the act does
(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall
not be imposed for an offense under this section.
. . . .
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the prosecu-
tion—
(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which the con-
sent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on her
behalf, has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law;
(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or
her unborn child; or
(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child.
(d) As used in this section, the term “unborn child” means a child in
utero, and the term “child in utero” or “child, who is in utero” means a mem-
ber of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried
in the womb.
Id.
35. Antonia Zerbisias, Killings Reopen Debate on Rights of Fetuses, THE TO-
RONTO STAR, Oct. 10, 2007, at L 01, available at 2007 WLNR 19824237.
36. See Martin, supra note 3.
37. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004)). See also Amy Lotierzo, Com-
ment, The Unborn Child, A Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe in Light of In-
creased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279, 282 (2006).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1841.
39. Id.
40. Id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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not allow the government to seek the death penalty for an of-
fense against an unborn child.41  Likewise, the act exempts from
prosecution: (1) conduct by any person “relating to an abortion
for which the consent of a pregnant woman . . . has been ob-
tained . . . .”; (2) “medical treatment of the pregnant woman or
her unborn child . . . .”; or (3) any conduct “of any woman with
respect to her unborn child.”42
B. State Feticide Legislation
Similar to the the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, the story
of Laci and Conner Peterson prompted the passage of more ex-
pansive feticide laws in many states.43  As a matter of fact,
roughly half of the forty states that currently have established
criminal penalties for fetal homicide44—either through separate
criminal offenses for killing a fetus or criminal offenses for acts
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Jacobs, supra note 9.
44. The forty states that have enacted laws that punish a third party for caus-
ing harm or killing a fetus include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.  See Ala.
Code § 13A-6-1 (2008); Alaska Stat. § 11.41.150 (2008); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-
1103(A)(5) (2008); Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-1-102 (2008); Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)
(West 2008); Fla. Stat. § 782.09(1) (2008); Ga. Code. Ann. § 16-5-80(b) (2008);
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4001 (2008); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-1.2 (2008); Ind. Code
§ 35-42-1-1 (2004); Iowa Code § 707.8 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3452 (2007); Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507A.010 (West 2008); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:32.5-14:32.9
(2007); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 208-C (2006); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law
§ 2-103 (West 2008); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.322 (2004); Minn. Stat.
§§ 609.266, 609.2661-609.2691 (2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-37 (2008); Mont.
Code Ann. § 45-5-102, 45-5-201, 45-5-212 (2008); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-388 to- 394
(2007); Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.210 (2007); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:1(I)(c) (2008);
N.M. Stat. § 30-3-7 (1978); N.Y. Penal  Law § 125.00 (McKinney 2004); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-18.2 (2008); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to- 08 (2007); Ohio Rev.
Code. Ann. §§ 2903.01-2903.09 (West 2008); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 691 (2007); 18 PA.
Cons. Stat. §§ 2601-2609 (2008); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-5 (2008); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-3-1083 (2007); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-1 (2008); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-
214 (2008); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (Vernon 2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201
(2008); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32.2 (2008); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.32.060 (2000); W.
Va. Code § 61-2-30 (2008); Wis. Stat. § 940.04(2) (2005). See also Commonwealth
v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1324 (Mass. 1984).
9
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of violence committed against a pregnant woman—were passed
in response to Laci’s and Conner’s murders.45
Although the majority of states have now criminalized the
killing of a fetus through specific statutory reform measures,46
these states have taken different approaches in implementing
such laws.47  For instance, some states have chosen not to enact
separate crimes for fetal homicide.  Instead, these states have
limited their focus to the harm caused against the pregnant wo-
man when a fetus is killed.48  An example of such a state is New
Hampshire, which has a statute decreeing a person guilty of
first degree assault if he or she “[p]urposely or knowingly
causes injury to another resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth
. . . .”49  In essence, New Hampshire has established a specific
crime for a third party’s actions of “purposely” or “knowingly”
harming a pregnant woman in a manner that causes the death
of her fetus.
North Carolina’s approach to addressing fetal homicide
presents another alternative for enacting criminal penalties
that limit the focus to the harm committed against the pregnant
woman.  This state’s law declares that “[a] person who in the
commission of a felony causes injury to a woman, knowing the
woman to be pregnant, which injury results in a miscarriage or
stillbirth by the woman is guilty of a felony that is one class
higher than the felony committed.”50  Thus, North Carolina has
chosen to enact a statute that increases the sentence given to a
45. See Jacobs, supra note 9.
46. Massachusetts’ law covers the crime of fetal homicide.  However, unlike
the majority of states with fetal homicide laws, Massachusetts has distinctively
established its fetal homicide laws through case law rather than through legisla-
tion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1973) (af-
firming the conviction for murder of a woman and involuntary manslaughter of her
27-week-old fetus); see also Cass, 467 N.E.2d at 1324.
47. See Brobst, supra note 33, at 135.
48. The three states that merely focus on the harm to a pregnant woman
when a third party kills a fetus are New Hampshire, New Mexico, and North Caro-
lina. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:1(I)(c); N.M. STAT. § 30-3-7 (the crimes of
assault and battery include injuries to a pregnant women, which “consists of a
person other than the woman injuring a pregnant woman in the commission of a
felony causing her to suffer a miscarriage or stillbirth as a result of that injury. . . .
Whoever commits injury to [a] pregnant woman is guilty of a third degree felony
. . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.2.
49. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 631:1(I)(c).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.2.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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third party when he or she harms a pregnant woman resulting
in the death of the fetus.
Those states—like New Hampshire and North Carolina—
that have limited their focus to the harm committed against the
pregnant woman when a third party kills a fetus, still follow the
common law “born alive” rule.51  This policy is demonstrated by
State v. Beale,52 where a defendant was indicted for the murder
of a woman and her viable but unborn child.53  The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that the unlawful, willful, and feloni-
ous killing of a viable but unborn child was not murder within
the meaning of the statutes governing first degree and second
degree murder.54  To support its holding, the court pointed to
the fact that nothing in any of the statutes or amendments
showed a clear legislative intent to change the common law rule
precluding an unborn child from being a murder victim.55
Other states have enacted feticide laws that veer away
from the common law “born alive” rule and focus directly on the
harm to the fetus.  In so doing, these states have expanded the
definition of a murder victim to include fetuses or have defined
the terms “person” or “human being” in their homicide statutes
to include unborn children.56  One such state is Idaho, which
defines “murder” as: “the unlawful killing of a human being in-
cluding, but not limited to, a human embryo or fetus, with mal-
ice aforethought or the intentional application of torture to a
human being, which results in the death of a human being.”57
Alternatively, some states, such as Georgia, Nebraska, and
Pennsylvania, have enacted separate feticide statutes that spe-
cifically protect the unborn.58  Georgia’s feticide statute
provides:
51. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 137 (N.H. 1980); State v. Wil-
lis, 652 P.2d 1222, 1224 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); see also Brobst, supra note 33, at
140.
52. 376 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1989).
53. Id. at 1.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id.
56. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2008); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2007); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 691 (2006); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN.§ 1.07 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (2008).
57. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001.
58. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507A.010-507A.060 (West 2008); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 28-388 to- 394 (2007).
11
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[A] person commits the offense of feticide if he or she
willfully and without legal justification causes the
death of an unborn child by any injury to the mother of
such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the
death of such mother, or if he or she, when in the com-
mission of a felony, causes the death of an unborn
child. . . . A person convicted of the offense of feticide
shall be punished by imprisonment for life.59
Nebraska and Pennsylvania refer to their feticide statutes as
the “Homicide of the Unborn Child Act”60 and the “Crimes
Against the Unborn Child Act,”61 respectively.
With reference to the circumstances under which a third
party will be held criminally liable for directly harming a fetus,
state feticide laws are generally placed into one of three classifi-
cations based on the degree of protection afforded to the fetus.62
The first classification includes feticide laws that have a viabil-
ity requirement.63  These statutes provide that a fetus is a legal
victim of a third party killing only if the fetus has reached the
point of viability—the point at which the fetus can exist inde-
pendently from the mother.64  Maryland’s feticide statute con-
tains a viability requirement and provides that a person may be
prosecuted for murder or manslaughter if he or she: “(1) in-
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (2008).
60. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-388 to- 394.
61. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2601-2609 (2008).
62. Lotierzo, supra note 37, at 287.
63. The five states that have a viability requirement for their feticide statutes
are Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Tennessee. See IND. CODE § 16-
18-2-365 (2004) (“ ‘Viability,’ for purposes of IC 16-34, means the ability of a fetus
to live outside the mother’s womb.”); IOWA CODE § 702.20 (2003) (“ ‘Viability’ is that
stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued in-
definitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems.  The time
when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination
of whether a particular fetus is viable is a matter of responsible medical judg-
ment.”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 20-209 (West 2008) (“ ‘Viable’ means that
stage when, in the best medical judgment of the attending physician based on the
particular facts of the case before the physician, there is a reasonable likelihood of
the fetus’s sustained survival outside the womb.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214
(2008) (“For purposes of this part, [the terms] ‘another’ and ‘another person’ in-
clude a viable fetus of a human being, when any such term refers to the victim of
any act made criminal by the provisions of this part.”); Commonwealth v. Cass,
467 N.E.2d 1324, 1324 (Mass. 1984) (stating that a viable fetus is a “person” for
purposes of the state’s vehicular homicide statute).
64. See Lori K. Mans, Note, Liability for the Death of a Fetus: Fetal Rights or
Women’s Rights?, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 306 (2004).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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tended to cause the death of the viable fetus; (2) intended to
cause serious physical injury to the viable fetus; or (3) wantonly
or recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the person’s ac-
tions would cause the death of or serious physical injury to the
viable fetus.”65  Maryland defines “viable” as “that stage when,
in the best medical judgment of the attending physician based
on the particular facts of the case before the physician, there is
a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’s sustained survival outside
the womb.”66
The second classification includes feticide laws that require
some minimum time period of gestation that falls short of via-
bility before a third person can be held liable for killing a fe-
tus.67  Some of these laws, such as those adopted in Rhode
Island and Washington, have a “quickness” prerequisite in ad-
dition to a minimum time period requirement.68  A “quick” fetus
is one whose movement in the womb can be felt.69  Other states
that use the minimum time period approach require only a spe-
cific time period and do not consider the quickening of the fe-
65. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (West 2008).
66. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 20-209 (West 2008).
67. Lotierzo, supra note 37, at 287.
68. The five states that have a “quickness” requirement for their feticide stat-
utes are Florida, Michigan, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Washington. See FLA.
STAT. § 782.09 (2008) (“The unlawful killing of an unborn quick child, by any in-
jury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it resulted in the death
of such mother, shall be deemed murder . . . .” ); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322
(2004) (“The wilful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of
such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall
be deemed manslaughter.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (2007) (“A person who will-
fully kills an unborn quick child, by any injury committed upon the mother of the
child, commits manslaughter and shall be punished for a category B felony by im-
prisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a
maximum term of not more than 10 years, and may be further punished by a fine
of not more than $10,000.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (2008) (“The willful killing of
an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of the child, which would be
murder if it resulted in the death of the mother; the administration to any woman
pregnant with a quick child of any medication, drug, or substance or the use of any
instrument or device or other means, with intent to destroy the child, unless it is
necessary to preserve the life of the mother; in the event of the death of the child;
shall be deemed manslaughter.”); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060 (2000) (“A person
is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: . . . [h]e intentionally and un-
lawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of
such child.”).
69. Mans, supra note 64, at 302.
13
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tus.70 For example, in New York, feticide of an unborn child can
occur “when a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-
four weeks.”71
The third classification includes feticide laws that punish a
third party for killing a fetus at any stage of development.72
70. Three states, Arkansas, California and New York, require that the fetus
reach a specific developmental stage before criminal liability for direct harm to the
unborn can arise. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102 (2008) (“ ‘[U]nborn child’ means a
living fetus of twelve (12) weeks or greater gestation.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00
(McKinney 2004) (“Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or
an unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four
weeks under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first degree,
manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, abortion in the
first degree or self-abortion in the first degree.”).  California courts have inter-
preted the point at which liability attaches to be seven to eight weeks. See People
v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994) (rejecting viability requirement and inter-
preting the term “fetus” in section 187 of California’s Penal Code to mean postem-
bryonic period occurring at seven to eight weeks after fertilization).
71. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2004).
72. The twenty-four states that impose criminal liability for killing a fetus at
any stage of development are Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (2008)
(“The term [person], when referring to the victim of a criminal homicide or assault,
means a human being, including an unborn child in utero at any stage of develop-
ment, regardless of viability.”); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900 (2008) (“ ‘[U]nborn child’
means a member of the species Homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is
carried in the womb.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(B) (2008) (“One commits
manslaughter by: . . . [k]nowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn
child by any physical injury to the mother.”); GA. CODE ANN. 16-5-28(a) (2008)
(“ ‘[U]nborn child’ means a member of the species homo sapiens at any stage of
development who is carried in the womb.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2008)
(“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a
human embryo or fetus, with malice aforethought or the intentional application of
torture to a human being, which results in the death of a human being.”); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2 (2008) (“An ‘unborn child’ shall mean any individual of the
human species from fertilization until birth . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3452
(2007) (“ ‘Unborn child’ means a living individual organism of the species homo
sapiens, in utero, at any stage of gestation from fertilization to birth.”); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507A.010 (West 2008) (“ ‘Unborn child’ means a member of the species
homo sapiens in utero from conception onward, without regard to age, health, or
condition of dependency.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2 (2007) (“ ‘Unborn child’
means any individual of the human species from fertilization and implantation
until birth.”); MINN. STAT. § 609.266 (2003) (“ ‘Unborn child’ means the unborn off-
spring of a human being conceived, but not yet born.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37
(2008) (“ ‘[H]uman being’ includes unborn child at every stage of gestation from
conception until live birth, and . . . ‘unborn child’ means a member of the species
homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.”); MONT.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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These statutes usually refer to a fetus as an “unborn child.”73
An illustration of this variation in feticide laws is Alabama’s
criminal homicide or assault statute’s definition of “person,”
which includes “an unborn child in utero at any stage of devel-
opment, regardless of viability.”74  This category of state feticide
legislation is more akin to the federal feticide legislation than
the other two approaches, because it criminalizes harm to an
unborn child at any stage of development and provides the most
protection to the unborn.75
When feticide laws are considered, a question may arise as
to whether the defendant must have knowledge of the fetus’s
CODE ANN. § 50-20-303 (2008) (“ ‘Unborn child’ means the offspring of human bee-
ings from conception until birth.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-389 (2007) (“Unborn child
means an individual member of the species Homo sapiens, at any stage of develop-
ment in utero, who was alive at the time of the homicidal act and died as a result
thereof whether before, during, or after birth.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01
(2007) (“ ‘Unborn child’ means the conceived but not yet born offspring of a human
being, which, but for the action of the actor would beyond a reasonable doubt have
subsequently been born alive.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.16 (West 2008)
(“ ‘Unborn human’ means an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from
fertilization until live birth.”); OKLA.  STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730 (2007) (“ ‘Unborn
child’ means the unborn offspring of human beings from the moment of conception,
through pregnancy, and until live birth including the human conceptus, zygote,
morula, blastocyst, embryo and fetus.”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (2008) (“ ‘Un-
born child’ and ‘fetus’ . . . shall mean an individual organism of the species homo
sapiens from fertilization until live birth.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (2007)
(“ ‘[U]nborn child’ means a child in utero, and . . . ‘child in utero’ or ‘child who is in
utero’ means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any state of development,
who is carried in the womb.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2 (2008) (“ ‘Unborn child,’
an individual organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live
birth.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon 2003) (“ ‘Individual’ means a
human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every stage of gestation
from fertilization until birth.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1)(a) (West 2008) (“A
person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with
criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the stat-
ute defining the offense, causes the death of another human being, including an
unborn child at any stage of its development.”); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-30 (2008)
(“ ‘Embryo’ means the developing human in its early stages.  The embryonic period
commences at fertilization and continues to the end of the embryonic period and
the beginning of the fetal period, which occurs eight weeks after fertilization or ten
weeks after the onset of the last menstrual period.  ‘Fetus’ means a developing
human that has ended the embryonic period and thereafter continues to develop
and mature until termination of the pregnancy or birth.”); WIS. STAT. § 940.04
(2005) (“ ‘[U]nborn child’ means a human being from the time of conception until it
is born alive.”).
73. Mans, supra note 64, at 304.
74. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1.
75. Mans, supra note 64, at 304.
15
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existence to be culpable for its death.  Some states have an-
swered this question in the affirmative.76  For instance, to vio-
late Indiana’s feticide law, a person must “knowingly or
intentionally kill[ ] a fetus that has attained viability . . . .”77  In
addition to having knowledge of the pregnancy, the issue may
arise as to whether there must be an intentional act on the de-
fendant’s part in order for him or her to be charged with the
crime of killing a fetus.78  Nevada is one of those states that has
enacted a feticide law requiring that the defendant act inten-
tionally or willfully before he can be charged for the act of kill-
ing a fetus.  Its feticide law states, “A person who willfully kills
an unborn quick child, by any injury committed upon the
mother of the child, commits manslaughter . . . .”79
C. Contemporary Applications of State Feticide Laws
Interestingly, some states, like Maryland, have only re-
cently applied their feticide laws to actual legal cases.80  Al-
though Maryland passed its fetal homicide law in 2005, it was
not employed until March 2008.81  The case where Maryland’s
feticide law was first utilized involved David Lee Miller, who
was convicted in the Baltimore County Circuit Court for the
June 2007 killing of his pregnant girlfriend, Elizabeth Wal-
ters.82  On September 9, 2008, Miller was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole, making Miller the first
person to be sentenced for feticide in Maryland.83
76. Tsao, supra note 12, at 465-66.
77. IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2004).
78. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(b) (2008); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1; NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.210 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (2008); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-32.2 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060 (2000).
79. NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210.
80. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (West 2008); see also Louisville
Man Pleads Guilty to Fetal Homicide, ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE,
Sept. 13, 2005 (a Louisville, Kentucky man pled guilty to fetal homicide, “possibly
becoming the first person charged and convicted since Kentucky established it as a
crime in February 2004”).
81. Jacobs, supra note 9; see also Jennifer McMenamin, Sentencing Postponed
in Slaying of Fetus; Pre-Sentence Probe Found Unfinished, BALTIMORE SUN, June
8, 2008, at 6B, available at 2008 WLNR 12782816.
82. McMenamin, supra note 81, at 6B.
83. Id.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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In other states, of late, there have been urges to reform feti-
cide laws.84  At least one of these calls for reform—that made in
Kansas—has been successful.  On May 9, 2007, Kansas’s gover-
nor signed a law that gave prosecutors the right to charge a per-
son who has intentionally harmed a fetus with murder,
manslaughter, or battery.85  Prior to the enactment of this feti-
cide law, which took effect on July 1, 2007,86 Kansas followed
the common law “born alive” rule.87  Moreover, when a fetus
was killed before this law was enacted, the only criminal penal-
ties imposed against the assailant were for the harm committed
against the pregnant woman.  In particular, the state law prior
to July 1, 2007, in pertinent part provided:
a) Injury to a pregnant woman is injury to a preg-
nant woman by a person other than the pregnant wo-
man in the commission of a felony or misdemeanor
causing the pregnant woman to suffer a miscarriage
as a result of that injury.
. . . .
(c) Injury to a pregnant woman in the commission
of a felony is a severity level 4, person felony.88
Essentially, this statute was parallel to North Carolina’s stat-
ute, in that it contained sentencing enhancements for a third
party when he or she harmed a pregnant woman and killed her
fetus.89
The current feticide law in Kansas is named “Alexa’s Law”
after the fetus of Chelsea Books, a fourteen year old pregnant
84. There have been outcries for reform in the following states: Indiana, Kan-
sas, and North Carolina. See John Milburn, “Alexa’s Law” Among Several Bills
Signed by Sebelius, ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, May 9, 2007, availa-
ble at 5/9/07 AP Alert KS 22:40:23 (Westlaw); see also Robbery Inspires Push For
New Feticide Law, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 30, 2008; Walker, supra
note 5, at A9.
85. Milburn, supra note 84.
86. Danny Jacobs, Baltimore County Circuit Court Judge Imposes Maximum
Term on Man Who Killed Girlfriend, Fetus, THE DAILY RECORD, Sept. 9, 2008.
87. See State v. Trudell, 755 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1988); see also Milburn, supra
note 84.
88. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440 (2007), repealed by Alexa’s Law of 2007, ch.
169, § 4 (codified as amended at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3452 (2007)); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-18.2 (2008).
89. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18.2.
17
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girl from Wichita, Kansas, who was slain in 2006.90  The law
allows prosecutors to charge an assailant with a crime against
the woman and a separate crime against the fetus when the as-
sailant attacks a pregnant woman.91  The law states that
“ ‘[u]nborn child’ means a living individual organism of the spe-
cies homo sapiens, in utero, at any stage of gestation from fertil-
ization to birth.”92  By enacting this feticide law, which defines a
fetus as a “human being,” Kansas joined the majority of states
that have abandoned the common law “born alive” rule.
One state that still follows the common law “born alive”
rule, in the face of immediate calls for statutory reform, is
North Carolina.93  Under North Carolina law, a fetus is not a
“person” within the meaning of its constitution.94  But, outcries
from the family of Jennifer Nielsen have spurred the most re-
cent pleas for modification of North Carolina’s law to allow
prosecutors to charge an assailant separately for the offense of
fetal homicide.95  Nielsen, a pregnant mother of two, was killed
on June 14, 2007, while she was delivering USA Today newspa-
pers in Raleigh, North Carolina.96  As the law currently stands
in North Carolina, Nielsen’s killer could not be charged sepa-
rately for killing her eight month old male fetus.97
The movement to enact a law in North Carolina that would
make it a separate criminal offense to kill a fetus has gained
widespread attention, as Nielsen’s family has continued to push
for such legislation.98  This, however, is not the first time that
90. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3440; see also Dion Lefler, Mothers Testify for
Alexa’s Law, WICHITA EAGLE, May 16, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4960075.
91. Milburn, supra note 84.
92. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3452.
93. Walker, supra note 5, at A9.
94. Stam v. State, 275 S.E.2d 439, 441 (N.C. 1981) (“[A] human fetus is not a
‘person’ pursuant to N.C. CONST. Art. I, §§ 1, 19”).
95. Marisol Bello, Slain Woman’s Family Wants N.C. Fetal Homicide Law,
USA TODAY, July 8, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/
2007-07-08-carrier_N.htm.
96. Id.
97. Nielsen’s male fetus, to be named Ethen, was to be delivered on July 8,
2007.  Amanda Lamb, Victim’s Family Makes High-Tech Push for Fetal Homicide
Law, WRAL.COM, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/2433919/.
98. Notably, Senate Bill 295 and House Bill 263 are two fetal homicide bills
that have stalled in committees in North Carolina, but these bills “could get new
life” following the North Carolina General Assembly’s reconvening in May, 2008.
Lamb, supra note 97.  As of February 13, 2008, “sixty-four lawmakers supported
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
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the issue of whether to enact such a feticide statute in North
Carolina has been raised.  For the state legislature, the choice
of whether to enact a feticide law that establishes a separate
criminal offense for a fetus’s death has been an issue since the
1980s, when it was first considered.99
Even those states that have abandoned the common law
“born alive” rule are not immune to calls for reform of their feti-
cide laws.  In particular, states that have feticide statutes re-
quiring either viability or a time period shorter than viability,
such as the quickening requirement, may be more susceptible to
criticisms.  Indiana is an example of a state where a fetus must
be viable in order for a defendant to be prosecuted for the sepa-
rate offense of killing the fetus.100  In Indiana, viability is de-
fined as “the ability of a fetus to live outside the mother’s
womb.”101
The limitation of Indiana’s viability requirement is evident
from the previously mentioned case of the Indiana bank robber
who shot Katherine Shuffield, resulting in the death of her twin
fetuses on April 22, 2008.102  At present, the feticide law in Indi-
ana only carries a penalty of two to eight years for killing a fe-
tus not yet viable.103  This means that the suspected triggerman
in the bank robbery can only face four to sixteen years in prison
if convicted on two counts of killing a fetus.104  As a result, there
has been a push to reform Indiana’s feticide law to cover the
death of any fetus, regardless of whether it can survive outside
the womb.105
giving prosecutors the option to charge someone with two counts of murder for
killing a pregnant women.” Id.  “Various versions of the bill have failed to pass the
General Assembly” for the past decade.” Id.
99. Id.
100. See IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2004).
101. IND. CODE § 16-18-2-365 (2004).
102. See Martin, supra note 3.
103. See IND. CODE § 16-18-2-365.
104. Id.
105. Rick Callahan, Prosecutor Proposes Changes to State’s Murder Law, AS-
SOCIATED PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, Apr. 30, 2008, available at 4/30/08 AP Alert
Political 22:50:25 (Westlaw).
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IV. Constitutional Challenges of State Feticide Legislation
State feticide laws, like those adopted in Kansas and Indi-
ana, have not been enacted without opposition.  These laws
have frequently been opposed on the basis that they are incon-
sistent with a woman’s legal right to obtain an abortion.  Moreo-
ver, feticide legislation has confronted other constitutional
challenges involving due process and equal protection concerns.
A. Roe v. Wade Challenges
Opponents of feticide legislation have argued that these
laws could be a backdoor way of creating legal rights for a fetus
in order to set precedents that will help ban abortions.106  These
critics assert that feticide laws undermine abortion rights and
give the fetus a legal status that it does not have.107  A universal
constitutional challenge of feticide laws involves the argument
that these laws conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Roe v. Wade,108 which legalized abortion.
In 1989, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services.109  In Webster, the Court re-
fused to invalidate a Missouri statute, which stated: (1) “ ‘[t]he
life of each human being begins at conception;’” (2) “ ‘[u]nborn
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-be-
ing’” and (3) “that state laws be interpreted to provide unborn
children with ‘all the rights, privileges, and immunities availa-
ble to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state,’ sub-
ject to the Constitution and this Court’s precedents.”110
Essentially, the Court held that a state is free to enact laws that
recognize unborn children, so long as the state does not include
abortion restrictions forbidden by Roe.111
Two years before the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a state’s feticide law conflicted with Roe, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted the
106. See Bello, supra note 95.
107. See Ellen Nakashima, Va. Debates Law on Fetal Homicide; Legislation
Entangled with Abortion Issue, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 26, 1996, at D01.
108. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
109. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
110. Id. at 504-05 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2008)).
111. Id. at 491.
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same issue in Smith v. Newsome.112  In that case, Richard
James Smith, Sr. was convicted of “aggravated assault, four
counts of armed robbery, and violating Georgia’s feticide stat-
ute.”113  The court rejected Smith’s argument that the feticide
statute was unconstitutional and explained that “[t]he proposi-
tion that Smith relies upon in Roe v. Wade—that an unborn
child is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment—is simply immaterial in the present context to
whether a state can prohibit the destruction of a fetus.”114
Like the Newsome court, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals, in Lawrence v. Texas,115 unanimously rejected a convicted
murderer’s claims that the 2003 Prenatal Protection Act—the
applicable feticide statute—was unconstitutional for various
reasons, including being inconsistent with Roe v. Wade.  In
Lawrence, Terrence Chadwick Lawrence shot his girlfriend,
Antwonyia Smith, three times, killing her and causing the
death of her four-to-six week old embryo.116  Consequently,
Lawrence was convicted of “capital murder,” defined under
Texas law as “intentionally or knowingly” causing the death of
“ ‘more than one person . . . during the same criminal
transaction.’”117
The Lawrence court explained that states may protect
human life “ ‘from the outset of the pregnancy,’” and “[i]n the
absence of a due process interest triggering the constitutional
protections of Roe, the Legislature is free to protect the lives of
those whom it considers to be human beings.”118  The court fur-
ther articulated that the Roe framework “has no application to a
statute that prohibits a third party from causing the death of
the woman’s unborn child against her will.”119
Despite the fact that Roe v. Wade arguments are frequently
used to challenge feticide laws, none of these laws have yet been
112. 815 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1987).
113. Id. at 1387.
114. Id. at 1388.
115. 240 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
116. Id. at 914.
117. Id. at 914-15 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(1),
19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon 2003)).
118. Id. at 917-18 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2007)).
119. Id. at 917.
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struck down on this basis.120  Moreover, the federal govern-
ment,121 along with many states,122 has specifically exempted
abortions from feticide prosecution.  A model of such an exemp-
tion is Alabama’s feticide statute, which provides that
“[n]othing in this section shall make it a crime to perform or
obtain an abortion that is otherwise legal.”123
B. Due Process Challenges
In addition to Roe v. Wade challenges, feticide legislation
has been challenged on due process grounds.124  Specifically,
these laws have been objected to on the basis that they are void
for vagueness.  A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to define
the criminal offense “with sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”125
The issue of whether a feticide statute is unconstitutionally
vague has been raised in those states, such as Minnesota,
where feticide can be committed without the defendant having
any knowledge of the fetus’s existence.  In State v. Merrill,126
the Supreme Court of Minnesota faced the question of whether
Sean Patrick Merrill could be convicted of fetal homicide after
shooting and killing Gail Anderson, who was pregnant with a
twenty-seven or twenty-eight day old embryo.127
Merrill’s due process argument was that it would be unfair
to charge an assailant with the murder of an unborn child when
120. Christine Vestal, States Expand Fetal Homicide Laws, ALTERNET, Aug.
22, 2006, http://www.alternet.org/story/40676/.
121. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act specifically exempts abortion from
prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004).
122. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (2008).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49, 52 (Ga. 1984) (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Parker, 9 Met. 263 (Mass. 1845)) (“ ‘This distinction, between a wo-
man being pregnant and being quick with child . . . is well known and recognized in
the law.’”); Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 213 (Pa. 2006) (holding that
the state feticide statute did not violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine); Lawrence
v. Texas, 240 S.W.2d. 912, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that the state feti-
cide statute left no ambiguity as to what conduct was proscribed).
125. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Lawrence, 240
S.W.2d. at 915.
126. 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
127. Id. at 320.
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neither the assailant nor the pregnant woman may have been
aware of the pregnancy.128  In response, the court explained
that “[t]he fair warning rule has never been understood to ex-
cuse criminal liability simply because the defendant’s victim
proves not to be the victim the defendant had in mind.”129
Transferring Merrill’s intent to kill Anderson to the embryo, the
court rejected Merrill’s due process argument and held that the
feticide statute provided the requisite fair warning.130  In addi-
tion, the court stated that “[t]he possibility that a female homi-
cide victim of childbearing age may be pregnant is a possibility
that an assaulter may not safely exclude.”131
In Commonwealth v. Bullock,132 the defendant argued the
void-for-vagueness doctrine on the basis that the state feticide
law did not require either the fetus’s viability or that the fetus
reach some minimum time period of gestation.133  Here, Mat-
thew Bullock strangled his girlfriend, Lisa Hargrave, who was
twenty-two to twenty-three weeks pregnant.134  After being sen-
tenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of fifteen to forty
years for Hargrave’s murder and five to twenty years for volun-
tary manslaughter of her unborn child, Bullock challenged
Pennsylvania’s feticide statute.135
Bullock asserted that since the state’s feticide statute did
not require that the fetus be viable at the time of its death, the
statute failed to provide fair warning of precisely what conduct
was prohibited.136  His logic for this argument was that until a
fetus is viable, it cannot actually be alive and cannot suffer
death.137  Rejecting this argument, the court held that the stat-
ute did not violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine as a fetus’s
“viability outside of the womb is immaterial to . . . the question
of whether the statute is vague in proscribing the killing of an
unborn child.”138  In reaching this holding, the court reasoned:
128. Id. at 323.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 323.
132. 913 A.2d 207 (Pa. 2006).
133. Id. at 212.
134. Id. at 210-11.
135. Id. at 211.
136. Id. at 212.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 213.
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[T]o accept that a fetus is not biologically alive until it
can survive outside of the womb would be illogical, as
such a concept would define fetal life in terms that de-
pend upon external conditions, namely, the existing
state of medical technology (which, of course, tends to
improve over time).139
Even when state feticide statutes require either viability or
a minimum time period, a defendant, like the defendant in
Smith v. Newsome,140 may still claim that the statute is uncon-
stitutionally vague.  In Newsome, the defendant argued that the
Georgia feticide statute was unconstitutionally vague, because
a jury was required to arbitrarily determine and apply each
member’s understanding of the term “quick.”141  In rejecting
this due process argument, the Court found that Georgia case
law had long adopted the common law understanding of “quick”
as the time when the fetus was so developed as to be capable of
movement within the womb.142
C. Equal Protection Challenges
Constitutional inquiries into the validity of state feticide
laws have included questions concerning whether enforcement
of these laws violates a defendant’s right to equal protection.  To
be successful on an equal protection argument in this area, the
defendant must prove that the feticide law treats similarly situ-
ated people differently.143
In Newsome, the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to
make this argument.  Particularly, he claimed that the feticide
charge violated his equal protection rights by creating two arbi-
trary and capricious classifications between Georgia’s feticide
139. Id.
140. 815 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1987).
141. Id. at 1387.  Although Georgia’s current feticide statute provides protec-
tion for a fetus at any stage of development, when Smith committed the feticide,
the statute stated that “[a] person commits the offense of feticide if he willfully
kills an unborn child so far developed as to be ordinarily called “quick” by any
injury to the mother of such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the
death of such mother.” See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(a) (1982), amended by GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-80(b) (2008).
142. Newsome, 815 F.2d at 1387.
143. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990).
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statute and its criminal abortion statute.144  When the defen-
dant committed the feticide, Georgia’s criminal abortion statute
punished the offense of criminal abortion with imprisonment
for not less than one year or more than ten years, while the
state’s feticide statute imposed a life sentence.145  The defen-
dant contended that the offense perpetrated by the individual
performing a criminal abortion would be synonymous with the
offense of feticide if the unborn child was determined to be
quick when the feticide occurred.146  The court denied Smith’s
equal protection argument and held that the difference in
sentences required by Georgia’s feticide statute and state crimi-
nal abortion statute was rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose.147
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bullock,148 the defendant
argued that enforcement of Pennsylvania’s feticide statute in-
fringed upon his equal protection rights.149  This argument was
premised on the fact that the feticide statute, in effect, ex-
empted a mother who voluntary aborted her own unborn child
while it held the natural father criminally responsible.150  Spe-
cifically, he asserted that natural fathers who kill their unborn
children were not treated the same as natural mothers who
aborted their fetuses.151
In response, the court found that the Pennsylvania General
Assembly had a legitimate reason for treating the mother and
everyone else differently.152  The court reasoned that a mother
is not similarly situated to everyone else in that she is the only
one who is carrying the unborn child.153  Thus, the court held
that the statute’s exemption for voluntary abortion was reason-
ably related to a legitimate state purpose.154
144. See Newsome, 815 F.2d at 1388 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-140
(2008)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 913 A.2d. 207 (Pa. 2006).
149. Id. at 215; see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2609 (2008).
150. See Bullock, 913 A.2d at 215.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 216.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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V. The Predicament of Feticide Legislation Encompassing
the Mother’s Actions
Besides constitutional challenges, a dilemma that has sur-
faced in the area of feticide legislation is whether the laws
should include the acts of the expectant mother when she termi-
nates the life of the fetus in a manner other than by legal abor-
tion.  These anticipated acts of the mother include actions such
as ingesting fatal drugs, consuming a large amount of alcohol,
or shooting herself in the stomach.155  Careful scrutiny of media
reports will demonstrate that these scenarios are not unlikely.
One such case is that of Theresa Lee Hernandez, an Oklahoma
City woman, who, on September 21, 2007, pled guilty to second-
degree murder for the April 2004 death of her baby.156  Evi-
dently, the baby’s stillborn birth was caused by Hernandez’s
methamphetamine use during her pregnancy.157
A. Applications of Feticide Legislation and the Issue of
Protecting the Fetus from Its Mother
Generally, most jurisdictions have declined to extend feti-
cide legislation to apply to the acts of the unborn child’s
mother.158 For example, the Florida Supreme Court faced this
issue in State v. Ashley,159 a case in which Kawana Ashley, an
155. See Tsao, supra note 12, at 476.
156. Hernandez’s supporters argued that prosecuting her would discourage
drug-dependent women from seeking health care during pregnancy and would
negatively affect both the health of the mother and the baby. See Murray Evans,
Woman Enters Plea in Death of Baby, ASSOCIATED PRESS & LOCAL WIRE, Sept. 21,
2007, available at 9/21/07 AP Alert MO 23:38:37.
157. Id.
158. See Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that defendant mother could not be prosecuted under the child abuse stat-
ute for prenatal conduct that resulted in harm to the subsequently born child);
People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 846-47 (Crim. Ct. 1992) (holding that the
defendant mother could not be charged with endangering the welfare of a child
based upon prenatal acts endangering an unborn child); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d
710, 713 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a parent may not be prosecuted for child endan-
germent for prenatal substance abuse); State v. Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 956 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1996) (dismissing the second degree criminal mistreatment of a child
charge and holding that a fetus was not a child within the meaning of the criminal
mistreatment statute); State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that defendant mother’s fetus was not a human being for the pur-
poses of the attempted first degree intentional homicide and first degree reckless
injury statutes).
159. State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1997).
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unmarried pregnant teenager in her third trimester, shot her-
self.160  “The fetus, which had been struck on the wrist by the
bullet, was removed during surgery and died fifteen days later
due to immaturity.”161  Because of the fetus’s death, Ashley was
charged with murder and manslaughter—“the underlying fel-
ony for the murder charge being criminal abortion.”162  Both the
State and Ashley appealed after the trial court dismissed the
murder charge and retained the manslaughter charge.163
“The State argue[d] that Ashley was properly charged with
both murder and manslaughter . . . .”164  The court disagreed
and explained that at “common law, while a third party could be
held criminally liable for causing injury or death to a fetus, the
pregnant woman could not . . . .”165  Essentially, courts “differ-
entiated between those actions taken upon oneself and those
taken by a third party.”166  Further, the court explained that
since none of the statutes under which Ashley was charged
stated that they altered the common law doctrine conferring im-
munity on the pregnant woman, this doctrine still remained in
effect.167
Although the majority of jurisdictions follow Ashley in find-
ing that the mother is immune from feticide prosecution, a
small number of jurisdictions do not adhere to this rule.  In
other words, these jurisdictions have extended their feticide
laws to cover the mother’s acts against the fetus beyond a legal
abortion.  One such jurisdiction is South Carolina.168  In Mc-
Knight v. State,169 Regina McKnight gave birth to a nearly full-
term, stillborn girl on May 15, 1999.170  An autopsy of the child
160. Id. at 339.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 339-40.
163. Id. at 340.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 341.
168. See Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (allowing the prosecu-
tion of a mother for causing her baby to be born with cocaine metabolites in its
system by reason of the mother’s ingestion of crack cocaine during the third tri-
mester of her pregnancy).
169. McKnight v. State, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003).
170. Id. at 170.
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revealed inflammations and the presence of a cocaine by-
product.171
McKnight was subsequently charged with homicide by
child abuse.172  This South Carolina statute provides that a per-
son is guilty of homicide by child abuse if he or she “causes the
death of a child under the age of eleven while committing child
abuse or neglect . . . under circumstances manifesting an ex-
treme indifference to human life.”173  McKnight was convicted
at trial and sentenced to twenty years, eight of which were sus-
pended, thereby requiring her to serve twelve years in prison.174
On appeal, McKnight contended, among other things, that
application of the homicide by child abuse statute violated her
constitutional rights of privacy and autonomy.175  The South
Carolina Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that
prosecuting a mother for abuse and neglect of a viable fetus due
to the mother’s ingestion of cocaine does not violate any funda-
mental right.176
Subsequently, on May 13, 2008, the court overturned Mc-
Knight’s conviction, finding that there was no clear connection
between the baby’s death and the mother’s use of cocaine.177
However, it should be noted that McKnight’s conviction was not
overturned on the theoretical basis that a mother could not be
held liable for the death of her fetus.178  Thus, an expectant
mother in South Carolina can be prosecuted for the acts she
commits, with the exception of a legal abortion, that causes the
death of her fetus.
Similarly, in October 2007, a St. Louis, Missouri judge de-
nied Sherri Lohnstein’s motion to dismiss an involuntary man-
slaughter charge for the September 9, 2006 death of her
171. Id.
172. Id. at 171.
173. Id. at 172-73 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85(A) (2007)).
174. Id. at 171.
175. Id. at 176.
176. Id.
177. See McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. 2008); see also Kelly Mar-
shall Fuller & Janelle Frost, Rebecca McKnight Trial: High Court Overturns
Mother’s Conviction, Woman in Prison for Killing Unborn Child to Get a New
Trial, MYRTLE BEACH SUN NEWS, May 13, 2008, at C1, available at 2008 WLNR
8964790.
178. McKnight, 661 S.E.2d at 365.
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newborn daughter, Zreanna.179  Lohnstein had a blood-alcohol
level of 0.18 percent when she delivered Zreanna and had alleg-
edly been advised during her pregnancy to stop drinking, but
had refused to do so.180  Zreanna, who was born at twenty-nine
weeks and weighed two pounds, was pronounced dead fifteen
minutes after her birth.181  Zreanna had a blood-alcohol level of
0.17 percent, well over the 0.08 percent required to find a driver
legally intoxicated in Missouri.182  The medical examiner deter-
mined that the mother’s acute intoxication caused Zreanna’s
death.183  In December 2007, Lohnstein pled guilty to involun-
tary manslaughter.184
The judge’s refusal to dismiss the charges against Lohn-
stein shows that, as in South Carolina, Missouri’s law does not
completely ban the prosecution of a mother for committing cer-
tain acts that result in her fetus’s death.  In another Missouri
case, a twenty-seven year old St. Louis woman was charged in
January 2008 with first-degree involuntary manslaughter for
allegedly using drugs during her pregnancy, resulting in the
2006 stillborn birth of her baby.185  Nevertheless, involuntary
manslaughter186 was the only charge available to prosecutors,
because in September 2007, the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District held that a woman could not be charged
with child endangerment for using drugs before her baby was
born.187
179. Tim Bryant, Guilty Plea Weighed in Death of Baby, ST. LOUIS POST-DIS-
PATCH, Oct. 19, 2007, at D16.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See Heather Ratcliffe, Mother Who Delivered Stillborn Meth Baby is
Charged, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 10, 2008, at B5.
186. In Missouri, a “person commits the crime of involuntary manslaughter in
the first degree if he or she . . . recklessly causes the death of another person.” MO.
REV. STAT. § 565.024 (2008).
187. See State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
when mothers’ addictive behaviors indirectly harmed their unborn children, they
could not be prosecuted criminally for child endangerment, which involves know-
ingly acting in a manner that created a substantial risk to a child under seventeen
years old).
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B. The Difficulty of Feticide Legislation that Protects the
Fetus from Its Mother
Advocates supporting feticide legislation that encompasses
certain acts of the fetus’s mother have drawn upon a line of rea-
soning similar to that articulated by the McKnight court and
have argued that a pregnant woman’s use of alcohol, tobacco,
and illicit drugs are not fundamental rights under the
Constitution.188
Nonetheless, the arguments against feticide legislation en-
compassing a mother’s actions seem to have a stronger footing.
One such argument is that criminally prosecuting mothers for
their prenatal acts may work to discourage certain mothers,
like those dependant on drugs and alcohol, from seeking health
care during their pregnancy, which can negatively impact the
health of both the mother and the baby.189  Another rationale is
that it would be difficult to determine what types of prenatal
misconduct would be subject to prosecution.190  To allow a
mother to be prosecuted for feticide could possibly lead to
mothers being prosecuted for acts such as smoking, not main-
taining a proper and sufficient diet, avoiding proper and availa-
ble prenatal medical care, or failing to wear a seatbelt while
driving.191
Moreover, if a mother is prosecuted for feticide, it could po-
tentially infringe upon her constitutional right to privacy.
From time to time, cases described as protecting privacy have
implicated at least two different kinds of interests: “the individ-
ual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and “the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions.”192  Feticide legislation that covers the mother’s acts
188. See State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 176 (S.C. 2003); see also Moses
Cook, Note, From Conception until Birth: Exploring the Maternal Duty to Protect
Fetal Health, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1329 (2002) (citing JUDITH LARSEN et al.,
DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS AND THEIR FAMILIES: COORDINATING RESPONSES OF THE LE-
GAL, MEDICAL AND CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM 45 (1990)).
189. See Evans, supra note 156.
190. Id.
191. See Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311 (Md. 2006) (holding that the state
legislature did not intend for the state’s reckless endangerment statute to be ap-
plied to prenatal drug ingestion by a pregnant woman).
192. Whalen v. Rose, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); see also James Drago,
Note, One for My Baby, One More for the Road: Legislation and Counseling to Pre-
vent Prenatal Exposure to Alcohol, 7 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 166 (2001).
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could potentially contravene a woman’s privacy interests of in-
dependence in making important decisions about her body.193
Such laws could also invade a woman’s constitutional right to
be free of unwanted governmental intrusions into the funda-
mental decision of whether to have children.194
Finally, allowing feticide statutes to cover a mother’s acts
outside of an abortion could destroy the logical distinction be-
tween a third party and the fetus’s mother for equal protection
purposes.  As the court in Bullock clarified, because these par-
ties are not similarly situated, charging a third party for feti-
cide while exempting mothers who perform legal abortions does
not violate the third party’s equal protection rights.195  If the
distinction between a third party and a mother is invalidated,
this could possibly open the door to an argument that even the
mother’s actions of exercising her choice to have a legal abortion
should be banned.
VI. Conclusion
While a few states still follow the common law “born alive”
rule, which requires that a fetus be born alive before a third
party can be prosecuted for feticide, the federal government and
the majority of states have abandoned this approach.  Instead,
federal and most state legislation have expanded feticide laws
to criminally punish a third party for the separate and distinct
offense of killing a fetus.  The circumstances under which these
penalties exist differ among jurisdictions.  Some states follow
the federal model and offer the most protection by permitting
criminal prosecution of a third party for killing a fetus at any
stage of development.  On the other side of the spectrum, some
states require that the fetus reach viability before a third party
can be prosecuted for feticide.
193. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that there was
no rational reason for the different treatment of married and unmarried people
and that the right of privacy to be free of unwanted intrusions and the fundamen-
tal decision of whether to have children was the same for married and unmarried
alike); Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (holding that a person
has constitutional rights to “the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law”).
194. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 444.
195. Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 215 (Pa. 2006).
31
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR103.txt unknown Seq: 32 24-FEB-09 9:10
74 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:43
Admittedly, feticide legislation is a controversial issue that
has been the source of both contemporary calls for reform of ex-
isting law and constitutional challenges.  The efficacy of a num-
ber of these state feticide laws has yet to be seen as these laws
have only recently been applied or have not yet been applied.
Also, the difficulty of whether to expand feticide laws to cover
the acts of the fetus’s mother, outside of a legal abortion, has
been a hotly contested issue.  Accordingly, the application of fe-
ticide laws will almost certainly continue to spur future debates
about the consequences of enacting and enforcing these laws.
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/3
